FILED Christina Spurlock CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT 12/16/2022 1:34PM

		BY: GHOWELL DEPUTY
1	David A. Warrington*	
2	Gary Lawkowski* DHILLON LAW GROUP, INC.	
3	2121 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 608	
	Alexandria, VA 22314	
4	703-574-1206	
5	<u>DWarrington@dhillonlaw.com</u> GLawkowski@dhillonlaw.com	
6		
7	*Pro hac vice forthcoming	
8	Timothy A La Sota, Ariz. Bar No. 020539	
9	TIMOTHY A. LA SOTA, PLC	
	2198 East Camelback Road, Suite 305	
10	Phoenix, Arizona 85016 (602) 515-2649	
11	tim@timlasota.com	
12	Dennis I. Wilenchik, #005350	
13	John D. "Jack" Wilenchik, #029353	
	WILENCHIK & BARTNESS, P.C.	
14	2810 North Third Street	
15	Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-606-2810	
16	admin@wb-law.com	
17	Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Contestants	
18		
19	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
20	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE	
21	JEANNE KENTCH, an individual; TED	No. CV-2022-01468
	BOYD, an individual; ABRAHAM HAMADEH, and	
22	REPUBLICÁN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, a federal political party committee	
23		
24	Plaintiffs/Contestants,	CONSOLODATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
25	v.	PLAINTIFFS/CONSTESTANTS' PETITION TO INSPECT BALLOTS
26	KRIS MAYES,	AND MOTION TO EXPEDITE
27	Defendant/Contestee,	DISCOVERY
	and	
28	1	
- 1	1	

KATIE HOBBS, in her official capacity as the Secretary of State; LARRY NOBLE, in his official capacity as the Apache County Recorder; APACHE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; DAVID W. STEVENS, in his official capacity as Cochise County Recorder; COCHISE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; PATTY HANSEN, in her official capacity as the Coconino County Recorder; COCONINO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; SADIE JO BINGHAM, in her official capacity as Gila County Recorder; GILA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; WENDY JOHN, in her official capacity as Graham County Recorder; **BOARD COUNTY GRAHAM** SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; SHARIE MILHEIRO, in her official capacity as Greenlee County Recorder; GREENLEE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; RICHARD GARCIA, in his capacity as the La Paz County Recorder; PAZ **COUNTY BOARD** LA OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; STEPHEN RICHER, in his official capacity as the Maricopa County Recorder; MARICOPA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; KRISTI BLAIR, in her official capacity as the Mohave County Recorder; MOHAVE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; MICHAEL SAMPLE, in his official capacity as Navajo County Recorder; NAVAJO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; **GABRIELLA** CAZARES-KELLY, in her official capacity the Pima County Recorder; COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; DANA LEWIS, in her official capacity as the Pinal County Recorder; **PINAL COUNTY BOARD** OF

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; SUZANNE SAINZ, in her official capacity as the Santa Cruz County Recorder; SANTA **CRUZ COUNTY BOARD** SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; MICHELLE M. BURCHILL, in her official capacity as the Yavapai County Recorder; YAVAPAI **COUNTY BOARD** OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity; RICHARD COLWELL, in his official capacity as the Yuma County Recorder; and YUMA **COUNTY BOARD** OF SUPERVISORS, in their official capacity,

Defendants.

Defendant Secretary of State Katie Hobbs' ("Secretary State"), Defendant/Contestee Kris Mayes' ("Contestee"), the Maricopa County Defendants Yavapai County Defendants ("Yavapai") (collectively, ("Maricopa"), and the "Defendants") response briefs to Plaintiffs/Contestants ("Plaintiffs") Petition to Inspect Ballots and Motion to Expedite Discovery break little new ground. Instead, the Secretary of State and Contestee each spend a significant portion of their Response briefs rehashing their respective Motions to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' Consolidated Response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, we fundamentally disagree with Defendants' contentions.

With respect to the putative subject of their Response briefs, Plaintiffs' Petition to Inspect Ballots and Plaintiffs' Motion to Expedite Discovery, Defendants raise two basic arguments: that any discovery should be limited to that specifically described in A.R.S. § 16-677 and that Plaintiffs' discovery requests go beyond what is authorized by that section. On both counts, Defendants miss the mark.

2627

23

24

25

28

I. Plaintiffs' Petition to Inspect Ballots Should be Granted

As a preliminary matter, there is an irreconcilable tension between Defendants' continued opposition to Plaintiff's Petition to Inspect Ballots and their position that section 16-677 sets the parameters for discovery in an election contest. Even if Defendants are correct in their claim that section 16-677 is the exclusive means of conducting fact-finding (they are not, for the reasons set forth in the Motion to Expedite Discovery and below), Plaintiffs' Petition to Inspect Ballots should be granted. There is no question that inspection of the ballots is permitted.

Section 16-677 states "[a]fter the statement of contest has been filed and the action is at issue, either party may have the ballots inspected before preparing for trial," provided the requesting party "shall file with the clerk of the court a verified petition stating that he cannot properly prepare for trial without an inspection of the ballots and shall file with the petition a bond" described in statute. A statement of contest has been filed. Plaintiffs have requested to inspect the ballots. Plaintiffs have filed a verified petition stating that they cannot properly prepare for trial without inspecting the ballots. And Plaintiffs have posted the required \$300 sum. Therefore, Plaintiffs have satisfied the statutory criteria to inspect the ballots.

Defendants do not seriously question Plaintiffs' assertion that they need to inspect ballots to prepare for trial. Instead, Defendants seek to preempt discovery by claiming, in the words of the Secretary of State, "there should be no trial." Secretary of State Response at 5. This is nothing more than a reassertion of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and does not impugn Plaintiffs' statement of necessity.

Contestee claims that even if Plaintiffs have a right to inspect ballots under section 16-677, Plaintiffs' request "exceeds what A.R.S. § 16-677 authorizes." Contestee Response at 5. But Contestee provides no support for this claim, and quickly engages in a rhetorical bait and switch by reiterating her Motion to Dismiss arguments as limitations on section 16-677. And on that point, the Contestee and the Defendants ignore the actual law on election

contests. Just to set the record straight, "honest mistakes or mere omissions on the part of election officers, or irregularities in directory matters, even though gross, if not fraudulent, will not void an election, unless they affect the result or at least render it uncertain."

Moore v. City of Page, 148 Ariz. 151, 159 (App. 1986)(quoting Findley v. Sorenson, 35 Ariz. 265, 269 (1929). Plaintiffs have been clear that they have not alleged fraud, so the standard this Court should look to is whether the allegations support a finding that would "render...[the result] uncertain." *Id.* That is the test, and clearly the closer the election, and the more votes cast, the less it takes to show such uncertainty.

Read most charitably, Contestee appears to be implicitly claiming that section 16-677 places some numerical limit on the number of ballots contestants can inspect, and that Plaintiffs' request exceeds this limitation. But this limit is found nowhere in the statute.¹

Contrary to Contestee's claim, Plaintiffs do identify the need for the "specific ballots in question," *i.e.* those that underwent duplication or electronic adjudication and those that show an undervote in the Attorney General Race: there is a documented history of errors in the duplication process, there is a documented record of errors in the electronic adjudication process, and there are good reasons to believe undervotes may be the result of technological constraints rather than true, intentional undervotes, as outlined in the Verified Statement of Election Contest.

Maricopa actually demonstrates exactly why Plaintiffs need to examine the ballots. Maricopa's objection to inspection states that "adjudication is a **subjective** process conducted by a bi-partisan board." (Maricopa Response 4: 1-2)(emphasis added). That is precisely why a party to an election contest is permitted to inspect the ballots—those tabulating the ballots do not always arrive at the correct conclusion, especially in light of the inherently subjective nature of some of tabulating, including adjudication, as the County points out.

¹ On at least one occasion, when facing the prospect of inspecting a large number of ballots, the Court authorized the inspection of a randomly drawn sample to assess the likely error rate. *See Ward v. Jackson*, Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-20-0343, 2020 WL 8617817 (2020).

2

3

4

5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12 13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22 23

24

25 26

27

28

Plaintiffs filed a valid election contest and have satisfied the elements of section 16-677. Their Petition to Inspect Ballots should be granted.

II. Plaintiffs' Motion to Expedite Discovery Should Be Granted

In the first instance, it should be clarified what is actually involved in this request after it has been refined and reduced by the Plaintiffs. At the return hearing on Wednesday, Plaintiffs pledged to re-examine what was needed, Plaintiffs did just that and communicated this to the Maricopa County Defendants yesterday. (Exhibit A). Most importantly, the opposition to the request for expedited discovery should not pose an obstacle to the petition to request the ballots, as the latter is clearly allowed under section 16-677.

Maricopa County's points about the breadth of the discovery are no longer valid. The precise request is as follows, as stated in the amended draft Request for Production sent yesterday to Maricopa County:

- 1. Records reflecting or sufficient to identify, for each vote center operated in Maricopa County on November 8, 2022, the following:
- A. All persons who cast a provisional ballot on Election Day that was not tabulated, the reasons why their provisional ballot was not counted, including any lists of such persons.
- B. All persons who cast a mail-in ballot that was not counted, the reasons why their mail-in ballot was not counted, including any lists of such persons.
- 2. The unredacted CVR^2 .

² The unredacted CVR, or cast vote record, contains images of the ballots, though given the constraints of technology limited resort to actual physical ballots may be needed. This clearly falls under Section 16-677. And the CVR will greatly aid in review of the ballots because it can be used to quickly identify the universe of ballots that is sought, including where that physical ballot can be located if resort must be made to that actual ballot. Redactions are unnecessary to preserve the right of a voter to vote by secret ballot and would eviscerate the ability of Plaintiffs to utilize the data on the extremely compressed timeframe. Moreover, while unnecessary, they do not object to the entry of a protective order concerning this matter.

Defendants do not seriously contest that any discovery in this case will need to be expedited. Nor could they given the hearing schedule the Court has set, with a hearing on these motions on Monday and an evidentiary hearing four days later on Friday. To the contrary, Defendant claims the opposite: that the timing of the election contest makes discovery impossible.

Defendants contest Plaintiffs' ability to obtain discovery at all. Specifically, Defendants claim that section 16-677 is the exclusive means of fact-finding, and that Rule 34 is inapplicable to election contest actions. These assertions miss the mark.

There is nothing in section 16-677 that identifies it as *the only* means of obtaining information in an election contest. Instead, section 16-677 merely provides specific procedures for obtaining one type of information: information from the ballots themselves.

Looking beyond the statute, Maricopa claims that a 1948 case, *Grounds v. Lawe*, 67 Ariz. 176 (1948) forecloses discovery. To do so, Maricopa extrapolates from language in the case indicating that the special nature of an election contest supersedes the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure; since broader discovery is not explicitly authorized by the statute, Maricopa reasons, it is not permitted. The problem with this approach is that there are lots of things that the contest provisions do not spell out in detail that must be reasoned through by the court. There are nearly 80 rules of Arizona Civil Procedure; there are eight statutory provisions relating to election contests. The contest provisions are not nearly as comprehensive as Maricopa suggests. They do not, for example, specify procedures for conducting a "hearing of the contest" or even for filing a Motion to Dismiss, as Defendants have done. *See* A.R.S. § 16-676 (discussing timing for filing an "answer." While it may be reasonable to interpret "answer" to include a Motion to Dismiss, doing so relies on the same application of extratextual procedure Defendants would forbid in the context of discovery).

What the election contest provisions do describe in detail is how to initiate a contest. That was also the only question at issue in the cited portion of *Grounds*: whether the

contestee could file an amended statement of contest. Given the specificity with which the contest provisions describe timeframes for initiating a contest, it makes sense that the contest provisions would supplant the general rules of civil procedure concerning amendments. It thus makes sense that *Gounds* is better viewed as a case concerning the initiation of a contest, rather than a wholesale repudiation of general judicial procedure in an election contest. Any effort to apply *Grounds* more broadly would be the application of dictum rather than the more limited holding of the case.

Finally, even if the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable in an election contest, Defendants pointedly ignore that Plaintiffs have purposefully invoked this Court's special action jurisdiction, *see* Statement of Contest ¶ 6, and requested a writ of mandamus as an alternative remedy with respect to each of their claims, *id.* ¶¶ 74, 82, 88, 95, 102. *See also* Consolidated Response to Motions to Dismiss at 9. And these are public records anyway, and subject to prompt production under A.R.S. § 39-121 *et. seq.*, and mandamus relief on that basis alone, even absent this Court action. Thus, there are separate grounds, apart from the statutory contest procedures, for granting discovery.

Lastly, Yavapai, Santa Cruz and Graham Counties have objected to ballot inspection. Plaintiffs seek no ballots from those Counties.

III. CONCLUSION

The object of this contest is not to rubberstamp an election regardless of the merits; it is to conduct a fair proceeding to determine the will of Arizona's voters. Doing so requires discovery. Nothing in the rules governing this contest forbid discovery. To the contrary, the statute explicitly authorizes the inspection of ballots. Accordingly, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' Petition to Inspect Ballots and Motion to Expedite Discovery.

1	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 2022.
2	
3	
4	By: /s/ Timothy A. La Sota
5	Timothy A La Sota, SBN # 020539 TIMOTHY A. LA SOTA, PLC
6	2198 East Camelback Road, Suite 305
7	Phoenix, Arizona 85016
8	/s/ David A Warrington David A. Warrington*
9	Gary Lawkowski*
10	DHILLON LAW GROUP, INC. 2121 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 608
11	Alexandria, VA 22314
12	*Pro hac vice forthcoming
13	
14	/s/ John D. "Jack" Wilenchik Dennis I. Wilenchik, #005350
15	John D. "Jack" Wilenchik, #029353 WILENCHIK & BARTNESS, P.C.
16	2810 North Third Street
17	Phoenix, Arizona 85004 602-606-2810
18	admin@wb-law.com
19	Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Contestants
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

EXHIBIT A

Timothy A. La Sota, PLC

2198 East Camelback Road, Suite 305 Phoenix, Arizona 85016 602-515-2649 tim@timlasota.com

December 15, 2022

Via email to:

Ms. Emily Craiger
THE BURGESS LAW GROU
3131 E. Camelback Road, Suite 224
Phoenix, Arizona 85016
emily@theburgesslawgroup.com

Re: Your letter of December 14, 2022

Dear Ms. Craiger:

Thank you for your letter of December 14, 2022.

Unfortunately, due to time concerns I cannot response to everything you state in the letter, but suffice it to say we disagree with your claim of the futility of our election contest/mandamus action. And I did want to make the following points.

You cite a 2020 Superior Court case to counter our argument about allowing certain voters to submit a ballot after the election. We disagree with your contention. As you know, Superior Court cases are not binding, and the Arizona Constitution contains an explicit right to suffrage. Art. VII, Sec. 2. If someone was denied the right to vote due to a wrongful act of your client, and that person can be identified, we think that vote should count.

You also go through a ballot counting exercise that I find difficult to follow, and I certainly do not agree with your calculations. It also omits some of our claims in order to produce a number that is lower than the 511-vote current difference. But even so, our Complaint also asks for mandamus relief. If there are additional votes that are lawful and have not been counted, they should be, even if does not make the difference in any particular race.

This is one of the reasons why it is difficult for us to understand Maricopa County's decision to "weigh in" on the overall merits of our claims, including our mandamus claims. It represents a significant departure from past practices, and we believe is completely unwarranted, especially in light of the closeness of this race.

Ms. Craiger December 15, 2022

I believe you have missed our point completely on the votes that the County's machines have wrongly tabulated as an "undervote". Undervotes do not typically go to adjudication. That explains why there are 50,000 undervotes in the Attorney General's race in Maricopa County, but only 3,639 adjudications (with 267 undervotes) in this race.

We are reviewing what you stated about the check in and check out procedures, the total number of voters impacted, and what it means for our case. Assuming this is accurate (and I am not suggesting you would intentionally provide inaccurate information), this is the type of information that, while it may not favor my client, is actually helpful in terms of resolving certain questions.

I have also attached a much smaller Request for Production to reflect our current plans to utilize the two potential trial days that were provided and our review of the documents the County has already provided pursuant to the public records request submitted by Kory Langhofer. That will be provided to you shortly

I would note that we would like the cast vote record (CVR) in unredacted form. That is, it should have the ballot identification number and ballot images. We disagree with any contention that this would disclose personally identifying information, and we would be willing to agree to a protective order if need be. And this was already turned over, albeit redacted, so it should not be at all burdensome.

This data is critical as we believe it would resolve any potential ballot access issues for the duplication, adjudication and undervote issues we have raised.

The technology allows these comparisons in electronic format. You probably saw the court filing from Contestee Mayes arguing that it would be too difficult to examine the ballots. These would seem to solve the issues raised while allowing our client to access the materials he needs.

Very truly yours,

TIMOTHY A. LA SOTA PLC

Timothy 2a Sota

Timothy A. La Sota