

D. Andrew Gaona (028414)
COPPERSMITH BROCKELMAN PLC
2800 North Central Avenue, Suite 1900
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
T: (602) 381-5486
agaona@cblawyers.com

Sambo (Bo) Dul (030313)
STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CENTER
8205 South Priest Drive, #10312
Tempe, Arizona 85284
T: (480) 253-9651
bo@statesuniteddemocracy.org

Attorneys for Defendant
Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs

ARIZONA SUPERIOR COURT
MOHAVE COUNTY

JEANNE KENTCH, an individual; TED
BOYD, and individual; ABRAHAM
HAMADEH, an individual; and
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, a
federal political party committee,

Plaintiffs/Contestants,

v.

KRIS MAYES,

Defendant/Contestee,

and

KATIE HOBBS, in her official capacity as the
Secretary of State; et al.,

Defendants.

No. S8015CV2022-01468

**ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE
KATIE HOBBS' REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS STATEMENT OF
ELECTION CONTEST**

(Oral Argument Requested)

(Assigned to Hon. Lee F. Jantzen)

1 **Introduction**

2 Defendant Katie Hobbs, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State
3 (“Secretary”), submits this reply in support of her motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs seek to overturn
4 the results of an election, disenfranchising Arizonans, in derogation of “the strong public policy
5 favoring stability and finality of election results.” *Donaghey v. Attorney Gen.*, 120 Ariz. 93, 95
6 (1978). They allege speculative and unsupported claims to argue for the extraordinary relief of
7 nullifying election results. This “election contest” must be dismissed.

8 **Argument**

9 **I. Plaintiffs can’t rely on incorrect standards to evade the specific requirements of an**
10 **election contest.**

11 Because they do not claim the election was tainted with fraud, Plaintiffs must make
12 specific and exacting factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss: They must plead facts
13 “showing that had proper procedures been used, the result would have been different.” *Moore v.*
14 *City of Page*, 148 Ariz. 151, 159 (Ct. App. 1986).¹ See also *Hancock v. Bisnar*, 212 Ariz. 344,
15 348 ¶ 17 (2006) (Ariz. Rule 8(a) notice pleading requirements apply to election contests). This
16 standard applies when, as here, there is alleged “misconduct” or an “erroneous count of votes”
17 under A.R.S. § 16-672(A)(5). And Plaintiffs must make this showing regardless of their policy
18 preferences or the merits of the procedures they prefer; if the purported errors could not have

19
20 ¹ Plaintiffs claim that *Findley v. Sorenson*, 35 Ariz. 265, 269 (1929) establishes that they can
21 prevail so long as the outcome of the election is “uncertain,” and that the Secretary misstates the
22 law in citing the formulation of the standard in *Moore*. [Opp. at 12.] But *Moore*’s formulation is
23 based on and interprets exactly the language from *Findley* that Plaintiffs cite. The Court of
24 Appeals’ interpretation of the relevant language from *Findley* is both more persuasive and more
25 authoritative than Plaintiffs’. And although the “uncertainty” language appears in these cases, it
26 cannot – and should not – be that a contestant simply declaring that the results of an election are
“uncertain” is enough to overturn an election. In any case, because Plaintiffs do not allege facts
sufficient to show that the number of voters or ballots affected were greater than the margin of
victory, they do not allege facts sufficient to show that the outcome was uncertain under any
understanding of this term.

1 changed the results of this election, those disputes can be addressed in future actions that do not
2 threaten the stability of elections or citizens' votes.

3 Plaintiffs try to resist the Secretary's Motion based on irrelevant and inaccurate
4 characterizations of the relevant legal standards and the Secretary's arguments. They argue that
5 "dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) only if as a matter of law, plaintiffs would not be
6 entitled to relief under *any* interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof." [Opp. at 10 (cleaned
7 up, emphasis original)] But they ignore that a plaintiff must offer facts to meet their burden, not
8 conclusory statements or speculation: "courts are limited to considering the well-pled facts and
9 all reasonable interpretations of those facts." *Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.*, 218 Ariz. 417, 420
10 (2008) (emphasis added). Here, there is a factual void at the heart of Plaintiffs' claims that no
11 amount of interpretation can fill: whether Plaintiffs' allegations could impact the outcome of the
12 election. Plaintiffs are required to answer that question with factual allegations, not vague
13 suppositions and legal conclusions. They do not do so.

14 This is not, as Plaintiffs contend, a matter of requiring evidentiary proof. Rather, the law
15 requires well-pled facts that, if proven, would meet the statutory standard. Plaintiffs have not
16 supplied such facts. Instead, they have speculated about an unspecified number of ballots that
17 might have been subject to various errors, including transposition observed in a totally different
18 election, [Stmt. ¶¶ 39-42], and mis-tabulation based on the example of three ballots, [Stmt. ¶¶
19 48-49, 52]. It is not enough to simply invoke the specter that some number of ballots could have
20 been affected, with no factual indication of magnitude of affected votes. As a result, this matter
21 must be dismissed. *See, e.g., Moore*, 148 Ariz. at 159.

22 Finally, while motions to dismiss may be strongly disfavored in the context of wrongful
23 termination matters, *see* Resp. at 10 (citing wrongful termination case for the proposition that
24 motions to dismiss are disfavored), the calculus is different in election contests, where time is of
25 the essence, *see Donaghey*, 120 Ariz. at 95, there is a "strong public policy favoring stability and
26 finality of election results," *Ariz. City Sanitary Dist. v. Olson*, 224 Ariz. 330, 334 ¶ 12 (App.

1 2010) (cleaned up), and courts apply “all reasonable presumptions” in “favor [of] the validity of
2 an election,” *Moore*, 148 Ariz. at 159. Quick resolution serves public policy, *id.*, while
3 speculative fishing expeditions like this one inject significant delay and uncertainty into the
4 process.

5 Once the correct standards for an election contest are applied, Plaintiffs’ allegations are
6 insufficient and each of their claims must be dismissed, as described below.

7 **II. Under the Applicable Standard, Plaintiffs’ Claims Must Be Dismissed.**

8 **A. Count I does not allege a viable election contest and must be dismissed.**

9 Plaintiffs claim that various issues that arose on election day in Maricopa County amount
10 to misconduct. But Plaintiffs again do not contend with the relevant caselaw, which states that
11 “honest mistakes or mere omissions” cannot constitute “misconduct.” *Findley v. Sorenson*, 35
12 Ariz. 265, 269 (1929). Plaintiffs cannot explain, for example, why some poll workers in
13 Maricopa County who allegedly did not properly “check out” voters did not commit “honest
14 mistakes” and unintentional errors, rather than something more sinister. And even if their claim
15 that Chairman Gates’s tweet, which gave voters several options in response to the printer
16 malfunctions, “was incomplete because it omitted two of the solutions available to affected
17 voters” [Stmt. ¶¶ 35-36] is taken to be true, they still don’t explain why this is anything beyond
18 a “mere omission.”

19 The election day issues underlying Count I also do not amount to an “erroneous count of
20 votes.” While no Arizona decision explains precisely what an “erroneous count” claim
21 encompasses, both its plain language and common sense make clear that this claim relates to the
22 miscounting of votes on ballots by election officials. For example, if 100 ballots were cast and a
23 correct count would have led to 48 votes for Candidate A, 46 votes for Candidate B, and 6 votes
24 for Candidate C in the contested race but officials counted the votes on those 100 ballots
25 incorrectly (because of, for example, an equipment or aggregation error that counted all 6 votes
26 for Candidate C for one of the other candidates), that would constitute an “erroneous count.”

1 Nothing suggests that this contest ground is implicated by Plaintiffs' allegations about Maricopa
2 County election day issues.

3 More important, under either the misconduct or erroneous count theories, Plaintiffs still
4 cannot show, as they admit they must [*see* Resp. 12], that these election day issues affected the
5 result of the Attorney General race (or even that it rendered it uncertain). The only "support"
6 that Plaintiffs seemingly muster shows that 395 votes may be affected. Even if the Court were
7 to assume these votes would all favor Hamadeh, which the Court cannot do, this is simply
8 insufficient under the applicable standard. *See Babnew v. Linneman*, 154 Ariz. 90, 93 (App.
9 1987). And Plaintiffs' vague allusions to "other mistabulations," [Resp. 12] none of which have
10 any support (other than Plaintiffs' speculation that they led to a "material number of voters"
11 being affected, *see, e.g.*, Stmt. ¶¶ 58-59), cannot magically lead to a showing that the election
12 results would be different, such that Plaintiffs' extreme remedy of nullifying the will of the
13 people is warranted.

14 **B. Counts II-IV are speculative and must be dismissed.**

15 Plaintiffs next insist that their vague and unsupported assertions about Counts II-IV are
16 sufficient because they may be able to develop support for their wild speculation at trial. [Resp.
17 13] Plaintiffs therefore seem to concede that this action is nothing but a fishing expedition for
18 them to gain access to discovery that may somehow "prove" their speculative claims. [*See* Resp.
19 10 ("Discovery and trial may or may not bear out the Statement's factual allegations.")]. This
20 entirely ignores the proper legal standards to be applied to election contests (*see* Section I,
21 *supra*), and their claims must be dismissed.

22 As to Count II, Plaintiffs assert, with no support, that some unknown but "material"
23 number of voters were denied provisional ballots "as a result of poll worker error." Resp. 14.
24 This bare claim cannot stand, as it doesn't reasonably allege misconduct or show how the
25 election results would have been different without this supposed error. *See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic*
26 *Ariz.*, 211 Ariz. 386, 389 ¶ 4 (App. 2005) (stating courts must reject "inferences or deductions

1 that are not necessarily implied by well-pleaded facts, unreasonable inferences or unsupported
2 conclusions from such facts”). The same goes for Counts III and IV about ballot duplication and
3 adjudication, where Plaintiffs point to an apparent error rate from an entirely different election
4 two years ago² or to less than a handful of instances of supposed errors (none of which they
5 allege relate to the Attorney General race). The illogical jump from these reed-thin facts to
6 Plaintiffs’ claim that the election results must be nullified is an “unreasonable inference” that
7 must be rejected.

8 **C. Count V is barred by laches, meritless, and must be dismissed.**

9 First, laches bars Plaintiffs’ claim about ballot signature matching. Plaintiffs do not argue
10 in response, nor can they, that they were unaware of the EPM provision and the practice of not
11 narrowly limiting a voter’s “registration record” to just the registration form for signature
12 matching purposes. Waiting (years) to bring a challenge to this until after the election results are
13 made known and Hamadeh has lost is precisely the type of dilatory tactic that has been squarely
14 addressed and rejected by Arizona courts. *See McComb v. Superior Court In & For Cty. Of*
15 *Maricopa*, 189 Ariz. 518, 526 (App. 1997) (rejecting similar attempt to “intentionally delaying
16 a request for remedial action to see first whether [a candidate] will be successful at the polls”).
17 Plaintiffs could have brought a challenge to the relevant EPM provision years ago, but do so
18 now, in this election contest context where they ask this Court “to overturn the will of the
19 people,” *Sherman v. City of Tempe*, 202 Ariz. 339, 342 ¶ 11 (2002), thereby prejudicing both
20 voters and the Court.

21 At best, Plaintiffs respond [at 15] by citing a 1986 court of appeals decision that rejected
22 an “estoppel” claim in an election contest. *See Moore v. City of Page*, 148 Ariz. 151, 155-56

23 ² An example in a less politically charged context proves the point. Imagine a breach of contract
24 action where X has a contract with Y. X has no evidence that Y has breached the contract, but
25 sues alleging that they did because two years ago, Y breached a separate contract with Z. On that
26 allegation, it would be patently unreasonable to infer that Y breached their contract with X. The
Court would not hesitate to dismiss such a farcical claim, and it should do the same here.

1 (App. 1986). But whatever the court of appeals said in 1986, it confirmed in 1997 that known
2 “violations in the elections *process*,” meaning “the manner in which an election is held” must be
3 brought before the election. *McComb*, 189 Ariz. at 526. The Arizona Supreme Court drew this
4 same distinction – that is, requiring challenges to “the manner in which an election is held” be
5 brought before the election – in 2002. *Sherman*, 202 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 10. And how counties verify
6 early ballots, which constitute the vast majority of all ballots cast in Arizona, is most certainly a
7 “manner in which the election is held.”

8 Plaintiffs’ claim also fails on the merits. Plaintiffs make no attempt to engage with the
9 Secretary’s arguments that there is a difference between a voter registration form and the voter
10 registration record. Instead, Plaintiffs merely conflate the two to suit their theory. [Resp. 17]
11 Their argument that “any purported distinction between ‘forms’ and ‘records’ is immaterial,”
12 Resp. 17 n.3, disregards the plain text and legislative history, as the Secretary has extensively
13 explained in her Motion. Plaintiffs ignore this, highlighting the baselessness of their claim.

14 **D. Plaintiffs’ requested relief for Count II is unavailable.**

15 Plaintiffs’ Count II asks this Court to permit a select group of voters to vote after election
16 day. Contest ¶ 82. Even if Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations were enough to justify some relief
17 on Count II, which they are not, *see supra* Section II.B, Plaintiffs cannot obtain a partial re-vote
18 after election day. That request conflicts with both statute and precedent. *See* Mot. at 9-10 (citing
19 sources including *Babnew v. Linneman*, 154 Ariz. 90, 93 (Ct. App. 1987), holding that votes not
20 cast cannot be counted in an election contest).

21 Indeed, Plaintiffs do not even attempt to argue that this relief is permitted in an election
22 contest. *See* Resp. at 8-9. Instead, they contend that they can evade the carefully selected
23 remedies available under A.R.S. § 16-676 by resort to mandamus. As the Secretary’s Motion
24 explains, that is wrong. Mot. at 9 (citing *Donaghey v. Attorney Gen.*, 120 Ariz. 93 (1978)). But
25 Plaintiffs neither address the controlling precedent on this point nor cite any contest case
26 permitting such a procedural end-run. Instead, they cite *Ariz. Pub. Integrity Alliance v. Fontes*,

1 250 Ariz. 58, 62, ¶¶ 11–12 (2020). But this case stands for the unobjectionable proposition that
2 election decisions can be challenged by a mandamus – not an election contest like this – *before*
3 *the votes are counted*, when doing so does not risk the integrity of the election or disenfranchise
4 voters. As the Arizona Supreme Court held as far back as 1917, “[i]t is no part of the functions
5 of the writ of mandamus to determine contested elections, or settle the ultimate title to a public
6 office when disputed. . . . [T]he remedy provided therefor is a statutory contest or the writ of quo
7 warranto.” *Campbell v. Hunt*, 18 Ariz. 442, 449 (1917).³

8 **III. Laches bars Plaintiffs’ election contest.**

9 Finally, this entire election contest is barred by laches. Plaintiffs claim laches should not
10 apply here because they filed the contest within the statute of limitations. [Resp. 5] But Arizona
11 courts have repeatedly recognized that laches can apply to bar a suit even when it is filed within
12 the statute of limitations. *See Harris v. Purcell*, 193 Ariz. 409, 413 ¶ 18 (1998) (“While plaintiff
13 met the ten-calendar-day deadline to challenge certification, he failed to exercise diligence in
14 preparing and advancing his case.”); *id.* 413 ¶ 23 (rejecting as “without merit” an argument like
15 Plaintiffs’, to collapse laches analysis with timeliness of filing under statute); *see also Lubin v.*
16 *Thomas*, 213 Ariz. 496, 497 ¶ 10 (2006).

17 Moreover, the Secretary’s arguments about prejudice are not “speculation,” as Plaintiffs
18 assert. [Resp. 6] Plaintiffs do not deny that the substance of their claims in this contest are near-
19 identical to the one they filed 17 days earlier. These dilatory actions necessarily prejudice both

20 ³ Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants “cannot have it both ways”: either Plaintiffs’ claims are
21 “cognizable and redressable under the election contest statutes,” or Plaintiffs “necessarily lack
22 any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law” and may pursue a mandamus claim. Op. at 9.
23 Here, however, the election contest statutes provide the right framework for evaluating Plaintiffs’
24 claims. The dispute is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to their preferred remedy for those claims.
25 Plaintiffs essentially argue that they have no adequate remedy because the governing statutory
26 regime does not contain their preferred remedy. But Plaintiffs do not have a right to their
preferred remedy; the Legislature has selected the remedies set out in A.R.S. § 16-676 as both
adequate and exclusive remedies for claims such as Plaintiffs’. *Donaghey v. Attorney Gen.*, 120
Ariz. 93 (1978).

1 the Secretary and this Court, leaving them with a far shorter time period to properly review,
2 respond to, and decide Plaintiffs' claims, including their burdensome discovery demands.⁴
3 Plaintiffs know about the hearing, in less than a week, to determine the recount results and the
4 January 2, 2023 date for new officials to take office yet inexplicably chose to sit on their filing.
5 Laches applies here.

6 **Conclusion**

7 For the reasons stated above and in the Secretary's Motion to Dismiss, the Court should
8 dismiss Plaintiffs' "election contest" with prejudice.

9 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 2022.

10 **COPPERSMITH BROCKELMAN PLC**

11 By /s/ D. Andrew Gaona

12 D. Andrew Gaona

13 **STATES UNITED DEMOCRACY CENTER**

14 Sambo (Bo) Dul

15 *Attorneys for Defendant Arizona Secretary of State*
16 *Katie Hobbs*

20 ⁴ Plaintiffs briefly raise arguments relevant to their Verified Petition to Inspect Ballots, arguing
21 they must be permitted discovery. [Resp. 4] The Secretary has opposed Plaintiffs' Verified
22 Petition and incorporates those arguments by reference. Because Plaintiffs fail to state any
23 cognizable claims for relief, there is no basis in law to permit discovery. Nor have Plaintiffs
24 established that discovery is necessary and their burdensome discovery demands are not in
25 accordance with A.R.S. § 16-677. Indeed, by stating that "[d]iscovery or trial may or may not
26 bear out the Statement's factual allegations," [Resp. 10] and that "Plaintiffs need not produce
evidence of anything at this juncture—nor can they" without discovery [Resp. 11], Plaintiffs
apparently concede that their claims are based on pure speculation. This Court should deny
Plaintiffs' request for a fishing expedition.

1 ORIGINAL efiled and served via electronic
2 means this 16th day of December, 2022, upon:

3 Honorable Lee F. Jantzen
4 Mohave County Superior Court
5 c/o Danielle Lecher
6 division4@mohavecourts.com

7 David A. Warrington
8 Gary Lawkowski
9 Dhillon Law Group, Inc.
10 2121 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 608
11 Alexandria, Virginia 22314
12 DWarrington@dhillonlaw.com
13 GLawkowski@dhillonlaw.com

14 Timothy A. La Sota
15 Timothy A. La Sota, PLC
16 2198 East Camelback Road, Suite 305
17 Phoenix, Arizona 85016
18 tim@timlasota.com

19 Dennis I. Wilenchik
20 John D. "Jack" Wilenchik
21 Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C.
22 2810 North Third Street
23 Phoenix, Arizona 85003
24 admin@wb-law.com
25 jackw@wb-law.com

26 *Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Contestants*

Daniel C. Barr
Alexis E. Danneman
Austin Yost
Samantha J. Burke
Perkins Coie LLP
2901 North Central Avenue
Suite 2000
Phoenix, AZ 85012
dbarr@perkinscoie.com
adanneman@perkinscoie.com
ayost@perkinscoie.com
sburke@perkinscoie.com

Attorneys for Kris Mayes

Joseph La Rue
Joe Branco

1 Karen Hartman-Tellez
Maricopa County Attorney's Office
2 225 West Madison St.
Phoenix, AZ 85003
3 laruej@mcao.maricopa.gov
brancoj@mcao.maricopa.gov
4 hartmank@mcao.maricopa.gov
c-civilmailbox@mcao.maricopa.gov
5 *Attorneys for Maricopa County*

6 Celeste Robertson
Joseph Young
7 Apache County Attorney's Office
245 West 1st South
8 St. Johns, AZ 85936
crobertson@apachelaw.net
9 jyoung@apachelaw.net
Attorneys for Defendant, Larry Noble, Apache County Recorder,
10 *and Apache County Board of Supervisors*

11 Christine J. Roberts
Paul Correa
12 Cochise County Attorney's Office
P.O. Drawer CA
13 Bisbee, AZ 85603
croberts@cochise.az.gov
14 pcorrea@cochise.az.gov
Attorneys for Defendant, David W. Stevens, Cochise County Recorder,
15 *and Cochise County Board of Supervisors*

16 Bill Ring
Coconino County Attorney's Office
17 110 East Cherry Avenue
Flagstaff, AZ 86001
18 wring@coconino.az.gov
Attorney for Defendant, Patty Hansen, Coconino County Recorder,
19 *and Coconino County Board of Supervisors*

20 Jeff Dalton
Gila County Attorney's Office
21 1400 East Ash Street
Globe, AZ 85501
22 jdalton@gilacountyaz.gov
Attorney for Defendant, Sadie Jo Bingham, Gila County Recorder,
23 *and Gila County Board of Supervisors*

24 Jean Roof
Graham County Attorney's Office
25 800 West Main Street
Safford, AZ 85546
26 jroof@graham.az.gov
Attorneys for Defendant, Wendy John, Graham County Recorder,

1 *and Graham County Board of Supervisors*

2 Scott Adams
3 Greenlee County Attorney's Office
4 P.O. Box 1717
5 Clifton, AZ 85533

6 sadams@greenlee.az.gov
7 *Attorney for Defendant, Sharie Milheiro, Greenlee County Recorder,*
8 *and Greenlee County Board of Supervisors*

9 Ryan N. Dooley
10 La Paz County Attorney's Office
11 1320 Kofa Avenue
12 Parker, AZ 85344

13 rdooley@lapazcountyaz.org
14 *Attorney for Defendant, Richard Garcia, La Paz County Recorder,*
15 *and La Paz County Board of Supervisors*

16 Ryan Esplin
17 Mohave County Attorney's Office Civil Division
18 P.O. Box 7000
19 Kingman, AZ 86402-7000

20 EspliR@mohave.gov
21 *Attorney for Defendant, Kristi Blair, Mohave County Recorder,*
22 *and Mohave County Board of Supervisors*

23 Jason Moore
24 Navajo County Attorney's Office
25 P.O. Box 668
26 Holbrook, AZ 86025-0668

27 jason.moore@navajocountyaz.gov
28 *Attorney for Defendant, Michael Sample, Navajo County Recorder,*
29 *and Navajo County Board of Supervisors*

30 Daniel Jurkowitz
31 Ellen Brown
32 Javier Gherna
33 Pima County Attorney's Office
34 32 N. Stone #2100
35 Tucson, AZ 85701

36 Daniel.Jurkowitz@pcao.pima.gov
37 Ellen.Brown@pcao.pima.gov
38 Javier.Gherna@pcao.pima.gov
39 *Attorney for Defendant Gabriella Cázares-Kelley, Pima County Recorder, and Pima*
40 *County Board of Supervisors*

41 Craig Cameron
42 Scott Johnson
43 Allen Quist
44 Jim Mitchell
45 Pinal County Attorney's Office
46 30 North Florence Street

1 Florence, AZ 85132

craig.cameron@pinal.gov

2 scott.m.johnson@pinal.gov

allen.quist@pinal.gov

3 james.mitchell@pinal.gov

*Attorneys for Defendant, Dana Lewis, Pinal County Recorder,
and Pinal County Board of Supervisors*

5 Kimberly Hunley

Laura Roubicek

6 Santa Cruz County Attorney's Office

2150 North Congress Drive, Suite 201

7 Nogales, AZ 85621-1090

khunley@santacruzcountyaz.gov

8 lroubicek@santacruzcountyaz.gov

*Attorneys for Defendant, Suzanne Sainz, Santa Cruz County Recorder,
and Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors*

10 Colleen Connor

Thomas Stoxen

11 Yavapai County Attorney's Office

255 East Gurley Street, 3rd Floor

12 Prescott, AZ 86301

Colleen.Connor@yavapaiaz.gov

13 Thomas.Stoxen@yavapaiaz.gov

*Attorney for Defendant, Michelle M. Burchill, Yavapai County Recorder,
and Yavapai County Board of Supervisors*

15 Bill Kerekes

Yuma County Attorney's Office

16 198 South Main Street

Yuma, AZ 85364

17 bill.kerekes@yumacountyaz.gov

*Attorney for Defendant, Richard Colwell, Yuma County Recorder,
and Yuma County Board of Supervisors*

19 /s/ Diana Hanson