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VIRLYNN TINNELL
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BY: GHOWELL
DEPUTY

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7	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
8	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE	
9	NANCY KNIGHT,) NO.: CV-2018-04003
10	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO
11	vs.) RESPONSE TO MOTION TO) DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
12	GLEN LUDWIG and PEARL LUDWIG, Trustees of THE LUDWIG FAMILY TRUST; FAIRWAY) COMPLAINT
13	CONSTRUCTORS, INC.; MEHDI AZARMI; JAMES B. ROBERTS and DONNA M.	
14	ROBERTS, husband and wife; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10;	
15	and XYZ PARTNERSHIPS 1-10.	
16	Defendants.	
17		
18	COME NOW, Defendants, by and through their attorney, the undersigned, and Reply to	
19	Plaintiff's Response that opposes Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint Count 2	
20	previously filed herein on or about July 30, 2018. Defendants' Motion should be granted in accord	
21	with the statutory provisions and case law precedence cited in both Defendants' original Motion,	
22	including but not limited to the provisions of A.R.S. §33-441, as well as this Reply and the attached	
23	supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities.	
24	RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 2018.	
25		LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL J. OEHLER
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27		Daniel J. Oehler, Attorney for Defendants
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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Plaintiff, in opposition to the pending Motion to Dismiss Count 2, filed a 10-page Response. Plaintiff's Response would appear to allege, in substantial part, Plaintiff's rendition/written narrative of the facts. Plaintiff's statements and fact positions are substantially irrelevant to the core of the pending Motion to Dismiss. For instance, commencing on page 3, Plaintiff alleges that A.R.S. §33-441 prohibiting "for sale" signs and other land/lot owner signage rights that may previously have been prohibited via CC&R restrictive covenants that prohibit such signs are now codified as unenforceable by state law. Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of A.R.S. §33-441 clearly describe other instruments affecting the transfer or sale of "any interest" (emphasis supplied) in real property and that this statute applies, pursuant to subsection (B), to any "covenant, restriction or condition" that prevents such signage. Yet, Plaintiff argues that the CC&Rs covering Tract 4076-B are statutorily compliant. Plaintiff's argument flies directly into the face of the reading of this statute when Plaintiff tells this Court that A.R.S. §33-441 applies only to a lot with a house located thereon and the "unimproved lot signage prohibition is unaffected by the statute. Plaintiff alleges that the subject statute "applies to homes..." See, Plaintiff's Response, p. 3, line 23. Such is clearly not the fact and under no circumstances can any reasonable interpretation that any Court could possibly give to the statute support Plaintiff's position. The Defendants' lot in Tract 4076-B that is unimproved is in fact an "interest in real property" as designated in subparagraph (A) of A.R.S. §33-441. Plaintiff is either fully missing the point of the statute or is attempting to be intentionally deceptive. The signage issue is and throughout this litigation dealing with unimproved lots.

Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendants are currently before this Court claiming that the entire set of CC&Rs have been abandoned. That is an issue and a potential argument, but that is not the issue or argument nor the subject matter of the pending Motion to Dismiss. While the Defendants believe that the CC&Rs have been abandoned, the issue that is currently before the Court is to the signage issues on unimproved lots that remain in Count 2 in Plaintiff's Complaint. One should, therefore, review for a moment the prayer for relief set forth on page 17 of the Plaintiff's Complaint dealing with the express issue which is the subject matter of the subject Motion to Dismiss. It reads, in pertinent part, on page 17, paragraph C:

"C. For an injunction immediately and permanently removing all signage on unimproved lots that is in violation of Desert Lakes Golf Course & Estates CC&Rs."

The Court, through its existing Order, has limited the argument to Desert Lakes Golf Course & Estates Tract 4076-B and, in theory therefore, Tract 4163, the tract in which the Plaintiff resides. Plaintiff's pleading therefore consist of a request to enforce the signage prohibition in Count 2, the only surviving Count and Plaintiff's prayers for relief consist of the following paragraphs:

- "A. Finding that Defendants violated the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Desert Lakes Golf Course & Estates.
- B. For an injunction immediately and permanently removing all construction from the real property located at 5732 Club House Drive that violated the CC&R setbacks or a trade or purchase of the adjacent lot to be maintained as a green belt. (Dismissed with prejudice in Count 1)
- C. For an injunction immediately and permanently removing all signage on unimproved lots that is in violation of Desert Lakes Golf Course and Estates CC&Rs. *(The subject of this Motion to Dismiss)*
- D. Plaintiff's recovery of actual and consequential damages in an amount to be determined by the Court or at trial, including, but not limited to, compensation and reimbursement. (Right to recovery lost if paragraph C dismissed)
- E. Compensation to all property owners for diminished value, to be determined by the Court or at time of trial, due to the taking of front and/or rear views as a result of the Defendants' construction that violated the CC&Rs of Desert Lakes. (Non parties-in-interest/Defendants Roberts dismissed)
- F. A Declaratory Judgment forgiving any CC&R construction violations that were not the fault of the purchaser of the home who unknowingly purchased a home that had been built, in error or deliberately by any builder, as out of compliance with the CC&Rs. (Not an actionable claim under Count 2)
- G. For recovery of Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs incurred, in the event this action is contested, pursuant to law and A.R.S. §§12-349 and Rule 11, A.R.C.P. (No attorney fees eligible)
- H. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the premises."

Clearly, the singular issue remaining in Plaintiff's prayer for relief in her Complaint is the prayer that is included in Paragraph C, again, requesting "the removal of all signage on all unimproved lots." This paragraph in the CC&Rs as to "for sale," "for lease," "for rent" types of

signs regulated in size compliant with what the Defendant's realtors (U.S. Southwest) are doing are statutorily prohibited as unenforceable.

Plaintiff at the beginning of page 6 at line 7 in her Response to the pending statutory Motion to Dismiss presents to this Court a series of "red herring" issue. The Plaintiff complains about Mohave County zoning laws and with the Mohave County Planning Commission and subsequently the Board of Supervisors. Plaintiff states that she sent letters to 617 addresses in Desert Lakes contesting a re-zone petition which has nothing whatsoever to do with the issue before this Court on the pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff refers this Court to the "egregious acts" that have caused substantial emotional and physical distress to the Plaintiff complaining, once again, of her presentation on the rezoning issue to the Mohave County Board of Supervisors, her apparent decision not to build a motor home garage on her Tract 4163 lot; references correspondence to or with an individual known as "Scott Holtry" dealing with her apparent motor home garage that she proposed and apparently decided not to build. Plaintiff touts the appropriateness of sanctions against the opposing parties' legal counsel for filing this pending second motion to dismiss (and/or otherh filings).

On page 8 of Plaintiff's Response, Plaintiff talks about the provisions of A.R.S. §12-349, sanctions against parties to a law suit which are fully irrelevant in regard to the pending Motion at any time prior to this Court ruling on the pending Motion. Plaintiff argues and suggests that this Court take action on her "breach of contract suit" (page 9, line 14) since it has been "substantiated" by the Arizona Attorney General's Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation because those entities have written to her and advised her that her complaint is a civil matter. Plaintiff appears to believe these state and federal investigative agencies have ruled in her favor and legitimized her suit (page 9, lines 13 and 14). These are fully irrelevant statements and have nothing whatsoever to do with the pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff alleges "harassment," "abuse," "being bilked," "annoyed to the point of sleepless nights," "fraud," and a multitude of other heinous events have precipitated out of Defendant's unimproved lot signs offering to sell their vacant lots.

Perhaps, the highest degree of failure on the part of the Plaintiff to grasp the current Motion and the status of this file, including the prior Orders of this Court, are set forth on page 2 under

Plaintiff's rendition of 'THE FACTS." Here, Plaintiff actually tells the Court, in reference to the "Grice residence" (a non party), that this Court has enjoined the Defendants from constructing a home or homes in Tract 4076-B as a result of court entered injunction orders issued at Plaintiff's request and states:

"The preliminary injunction was violated with new home construction that was applied for by the Defendants in March 2018 and was approved and was approved, after engineering review by the Mohave County Development Services, in May 2018. Oral Arguments were heard on April 2, 2018 and the Court granted the Plaintiff rights to enforcement for Count 2 in Tract 4076-B in open court. The Defendants have violated the preliminary injunction for the rear yard setback on new home construction at 1839 Lipan Blvd. in Tract 4076-B." (Plaintiff's 7/31/2018 Response, p. 2, lines 16-22.) (Emphasis added.)

There, of course, have been no injunctions of any type issued by this Court, the singular order being the dismissal of Court 1 of Plaintiff's Complaint.

THE LAW

A.R.S. §33-441 is fully applicable as set forth in the original Motion to Dismiss. We are here dealing with an interest in the Defendants' real property. The statute specifically allows signage of requisite size in conformance with industry standards that includes a single rider thereon not to exceed 6 x 24 inches. The statute applies to improved and unimproved real property and to "any interest" therein. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is of the requisite size and, as does any for sale sign, advertises the property for sale with the words "will build to suit" carrying a rider of the listing agent, U.S. Southwest Properties, a licensed brokerage firm doing business in the State of Arizona and disclosing the owners' company, Fairway Constructors, Inc., and a telephone number.

Plaintiff in her opposition suggests that "advertising" is prohibited. A for sale sign is absolutely unquestionably advertising. A "for sale" sign with a listed brokerage firm is advertising. A "for lease" sign is advertising. A "for rent" sign is advertising. The name of the advertiser on such an advertisement is obviously intended as is the advertiser's contact information such as a telephone number and/or address. The singular limitation is the size of the display:

"The size of a sign offering a property for sale shall be in conformance with the industry standard size sign, which shall not exceed eighteen by twenty-four inches, and the industry standard size sign rider, which shall not exceed six by twenty-four inches." A.R.S. §33-441(A).

It appears that the single reported appellate decision dealing with this relatively new statute, A.R.S. §33-441 can be found in <u>Hawk v. PC Village Association</u>, Inc., 233 Ariz. 94, 309 P.3d 918, 668 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. App. Div. 1, Dept. A, 2013).

The <u>Hawk</u>, <u>supra</u>, court specifically found that A.R.S. §33-441 trumps CC&R provisions and further that CC&Rs are within this law's description of a contract "or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale... of real property." <u>Hawk</u>, <u>supra</u>, at 922.

Hawk, supra, went on to state:

"Such rights and obligations affect the property's transfer or sale." <u>Id.</u>, at 922.

* * *

"A.R.S. §33-441 had the effect of changing the substantive rights of the parties to the CC&Rs. The statute deprived the Pine Canyon property owners of their vested, substantive rights under Section 12.3 to live in a sign-free community." <u>Id.</u>, at 922-923.

The <u>Hawk</u>, <u>supra</u>, court sets forth a test:

- 1. The enforcing entity (Plaintiff) must bear the burden of showing the statute is unconstitutional;
 - 2. Plaintiff must show substantial impairment of the contractual relationship;
- 3. <u>If</u> there is a showing of substantial impairment, then Plaintiff must show the absence of a significant and legitimate public purpose for the statutes existence or, at a minimum, that the impairment is an unreasonable means of achieving the purpose. <u>City Energy Reserves</u> <u>Group</u>, 459 U.S. at 411–13, 103 S.Ct. 697; <u>McCleod</u>, 174 Ariz at 359; 849 P.2d at 1389.

The court went on to find that the applicable statute does not impinge on the parties' reasonable expectations and is valid and constitutional.

A.R.S. §33-441 is the law in the State of Arizona. Unless or until it is found to be unconstitutional by a court of record, it is the law.

The words "will build to suit" (if this is now the basis of Plaintiff's complaint) on a realtor's sign with a telephone contact number is one and the same with the words "for sale." Clearly, the lot

is for sale. 1 2 Plaintiff's objections are not well taken, are not grounded in fact and the statutory prohibition against page 4, paragraph 12, of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for 3 Desert Lakes Golf Course & Estates 4076-B are, as a result of the subject statute, contrary to Arizona 4 5 law and cannot stand. Plaintiff's prayer for relief requesting an injunction "removing all signage on unimproved 6 7 lots..." is contrary to the current law; Plaintiff's Complaint, having been dismissed as to Count 1 with 8 prejudice, should be dismissed as to Count 2 with prejudice. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _____ day of August, 2018. 9 LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL J. OEHLER 10 11 12 Attorney for Defendants 13 COPY of the foregoing emailed this 6 th day of August, 2018, to: 14 15 Honorable Derek Carlisle 16 Mohave County Superior Court Division 2 2001 College Drive 17 Lake Havasu City, Arizona 86403 18 (928) 453-0739 Mary making@courts.az.gov 19 Plaintiff Pro Per 20 Nancy Knight 1803 E. Lipan Circle 21 Fort Mohave, Arizona 86426 (928) 768-1537 nancyknight@frontier.com 22 23 By: 24 Patricia L. Emond, Legal Assistant 25 26

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